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I" INTRODUCTION 
1. Because of the deadlines set out beneath the Community must define its 
future sugar policy as regards its international position vis-&-vis the 
International Sugar Agreement, its obligations towards developing countries 
which are set out inter alia in Protocol No 22 to the Act of Accession - and 
its internal ~rangements applicable from the 1975/76 marketing year as soon as 
possible. 
Deadlines · 
2. Firstly, the International Sugar Agreement expires at the end of 1973. A 
conference to negotiate a new agreement opened in Geneva under the auspices of 
UNCTAD during r-iay (first session) and will continue during September and 
October (second session). 
Secondly, the present Commonwealth Sugar Agreement expires on 31 December 1974 
and the second Yaounde Convention one month later. Negotiations for the future 
Convention of Association ~d special arrangements to be applied to sugar 
· produced by the countries concerned are scheduled to begin in August 1973. 
Finally, the Community's internal sugar policy, which at present takes the form of 
temporary production arrangements, is valid until the end of the 1974/75 
marketing year only. Given the peculiarities of the sugar market - in particular 
the fact that contracts are concluded before sowing commences - new production 
arrangements must be finalized before September 1974• 
3. Because of the olose relationship between fUture internal policy on the one 
ha.nd and the International Sugar Agreement and Arrangements with a number of 
developing countries on the other, the Council must lay down general guidelines 
for.the sugar policy as a whole before the end of July 19731 so that the 
Community may: 
1
see also Doo R/1291/73 (AGRI 412), Annex (page 6). 
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(a) make a. useful con·~ribution to the second session of the negotiations 
for the new International Agreement; 
(b) open n~gotiations with the sugar-producing countries specified in particular 
in Protoc-ol No 22 to the Act of Accession as planned; 
(c) work out the details of its own internal policy in good time, i.e. lay down 
all the necessar.y detailed rules for its application before September 1974. 
Points of departure 
4. International Suey.r Agreement 
The present International Sugar Agreement, which expires on 31 December next, 
is being renegotiated under the auspices of UNCTAD. 
-The Community has often claimed that it is prepared to support the policy 
embodied in the Agreement. If it now wishes to play a constructive part in the 
Geneva negotiations and make a real contribution to the new Agreemen~ it must 
accede as a net importer. 
In view of the need to develop production in ard ecparts qy developing countries, 
if supplies on the world market are normal, the Community should pursue a 
production and marketing polioy which would keep its exports well below its 
imports. 
5· Commonwealth Sugar Agreement 
There has been a preferential agreement between the United Kingdom and a number 
of trade associations in sugar-exporting Commonweal-th countries ·since 1951. This 
Agre~ment, which provides guarantees as regards quantities and prices, has been 
an important factor in the economic development of these supplying countries~ It 
covers a total of approximately 1 675 000 metric tons (expressed in terms of 
white sugar) for importation into the United Kingdom; this figure in_cludef! the 
330 000 metric tons supplied by Australia, the only developed e~orting countr.y 
which is party to the Agreement. .Bearing in mind both of the letter and spirit of 
Protocol No 22 to the Act of Accession and the Joint Declaration of Intent on the 
development of trade relations with the developing independent Commonwealth 
countries in Asia, and in particular the provisions regarding India, and not 
forgetting the sugar interests of the AASM (Madagascar and the Congo-::Srazzaville) 
and the OCT ( Surinam), ex:i sting oommi tment s representing approximately 
1 400 000 metric tons1 (expressed in terms of White sugar) must be taken into 
consideration'in the forthcoming negotiations. 
• 
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6. ~:terna.l si tua.tion of the enlarged Communi_!;;t 
Total human consumption in the enlarged Community increased from 9 million metric 
tons in 1968/69 to 985 million metria tons in 1972/73· 
Since per ca.pi!~ consumption is already relatively high and its annual growth rate 
is ver,y low, total human consumption in the Community is unlikely to exceed 
9.8 million metric tons in 1975/76. 
T.he enlarged EE0 1s sugar production from an area of approximately 1 410 000 
·hectares fluctuated between ~.2 and 9·7 million metric tons over the 1968/69 to 
1972/73 marketing years. Assuming normal productivity and allowing for the 
increased area under beet in 1973/74 {1 555 000 he~tares), normal existing 
production may be estimated at between 9.8 and 10 million metric tons. The 
enlarged Community is therefore self-sufficient in sugar on the basis of the 
present area under beet. 
Over recent years the level of sugar production has been determined by the quota. 
arrangements applied in the~ommunity as originally constituted and by the 
united Kingdom's obligations towards certain countries party to the Commonwealth 
' Sugar Agreement. Articles 39 and 110 of the Treaty must serve as a basis for the 
Communi tyls future policy. Th...i.s means: 
.-that beet.and cane producers must be in a position to produce under oondit1ons, 
and in particular price levels, which will ensure them of a reasonable standard 
of living and that supplies must reach consume~a at reasonable prices and in the 
best competitive conditione; 
- that the harmonious development of world trade must be gu.,ara.ntee~ in particular 
by taking aoc~unt of fut~ oommi tments under the Intema.tiona,l Sugar 
Agreement and towa.rde cleveloping countries 8 
. •' 
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II. FUTURE mTERNAL POLicY 
A. 'It,le present, system 
7. It would seem appropriate first of all to review experience acquired 
under the quota system which has been in foroe since 1968. 
Regulation No 1009/67/EEO laid down transitional measures introducing a system 
of produotion quotas designeds 
(a) to limit total production; 
(b) to maintain .. e"d.st~n·g :pr~ductio.~ wi t~.!l ~er:tain limits even in the regions 
which are less suited to beet growing; 
(c) to increase produotion in the regions best suited to beet growing to 
encourage specialisation within· the Oommunityf 
. (d) to keep the financial burden within bounds. 
8. It can now be said, after five years experience, thats 
(a) it has been possible to limit total production in the Community as 
originally constituted to llO.to 12o% of consumption; 
(b) in the regions which a.re less suited to beet growing, production has been 
kept just below the level of the basio quotas; 
(o) there has been a significant move to regional specialization. In the 
regions best suited to bee! .. gr~~n.g, ·production has risen to 
·120 to 14o% of the basic quota and· 140 to 16o% of the reference production 
(1961/62 to 1965/66). Finally, the trend towards specialization among 
beet-producing holdings has continued. Since 1968 the total number of beet 
·producers has fallen b,y approximately 3o%, making it possible to improve the 
structure of production and allowing new producers to enter the market; 
(d) the effect of the differentiated price gu.a.rantee (viz. the oha.rging of a 
production lev,y on sugar produced in excess of the basic quota and the 
absence of any price guarantee for sugar produced in exc~ss of the maximum 
quota)has been·t~t losses assooiated with the disposal of ·surpluses have, 
t~r several years now, been a charge on the producers themselves. 
• 
' . ' '' 
• 
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B • Future su,w polic:t; 
9· It is clear from what ha.s been said above tha.t sugar production must be 
limited to some extent. It will be difficult to achieve this by fixing a 
uniform price for all production within the desired output because producer~ 
reactions to changes in price levels are virtually unpredictable. 
EXperience acquired in this field, estimated production costs and other 
agrioul tural prices combine to suggest that the price likely to hold 
production dawn to the specified level would be at least 25% lower than the 
present price. 
10. Given yield per hectare, production costs and alternative crops, the 
consequences, for each region of the Community, of fixing a single price at 
such a level m~ be summarized as follows: 
- sugar production would increase in. the regions best suited to beet growing; 
- production would drop sharply; or might even cease, in the regions less suited 
to beet growing. Thus, sugar production in the French Antilles could 
disappear; production in Reunion and in Italy would fall v~y sharply~ 
as would production in several Northern regions of the Community. The ending 
of, or any significant reduction in, cane or beet cultivation would of course 
have very adverse consequences for the sugar industry, with all the 
difficulties which this would entail from the social and investment point of 
view. 
Finally, the development of the Community is such that there can be no question 
at the present time of a deQision being taken at Community level which would 
mean that, within a short space of time, all or a substantial part of the 
sugar industry would disappear and that· beet would cease to be grown in a 
number of regions. 
. .. ; ... 
'I 
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11. The difficulties which would arise for regions less suited to beet 
growing would not be solved merely by fixing a single price a.nd, as a corollary, 
placing a ceiling on Communi t;y production, a.nd consequently spreading a:ny 
losses due to the disposal of surplus production over total production. 
Control of production by means of a quota gystem 
12. Experience acquired under the present quota sy-steii1,a.nd the .difficulty 
of controlling production by fixing an equilibri'Wll price) seem to point to 
the necessity of controlling production by means of a quota sy-stem. 
It would be advisable however, as at present, to limit application of such a 
sy-stem to a specified period. 
It would seem a.ppropri.ate to limit the period of application t~ ~ years. 
13. The _bases for a new system of production quotas are to be found in 
Regulation No 1009/67/FJOO. 
Article 22 specifies in particular that: 
-. existing production arrangements, including the provisions concerning 
national basic quantities,their.distribution between factories or undertakings 
and price differentiation, are to be repealed with effect trom 1 July 1975; and 
- definitive arrangements m~ not involve ~ discrimination between Community 
produoers. 
Consequently, under the new system, quotas should be allocated directly to the 
undertakings involved, no basic quantities being fixed for Member States. 
Qnotas should be established for all undertakings on the basis of their 
···'·--
/ 
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production over an identical reference period. Regional specialization should 
be encouraged ·by reserving production in excess of the basic quotas for 
the regions best suited to beet growing, within the allowed maximum for 
total production. 
The aims of the new quota system ma;y be summarized as follows: 
, 
(a) the fixing of a price level for production within the basic quotas~ 
which would mean that· a certain amount of beet would still be grown 
in regions other than those best suited to its producti~ 
(b) the possibility of increasing production above the level of the basic 
quotas in the regions best suited to beet growing; 
r(o) limiting production to a level determined by potential outlets within 
the Community. account being taken of commitments under Protocol No 22 
of the Act of Accession, and the possibility of exporting to the world 
market. ; 
. (a) Measures for maintaining a certain level of production in existing 
beet-growing areas 
14. If one of the aims of the qu~ta system is to be achieved, the price 
level for production within the basic quotas ("A" sugar beet or sugar) must 
be kept at a level corresponding to that applied at the present time. Basic 
quotas would be calculated on the basis of the total production of each sugar 
undertaking over an identical reference period. The sum of the basic quotas 
1 
to be allocated should be limited to approximately 8.4 million metric tons·, 
representing the difference between Community consumption in 1975/76 and 
imports under Protocol No 22 to the Act of Accession. The reference period 
mentioned above could be 1968/69 to 1972/73 inclusive. Under these conditions 
ea.oh undertaking's basic quota would be equal to its reference production 
multiplied. by a coefficient to be determined. However if, on the basis of this 
calculation, the basio quota for an undertaking in one of the new Member States 
of the Community were to prove lower than the basic quota now applicable, the 
latter should be selected under the new system, in vi~ of the differing initial 
positions of the Community as originally constituted and the new Member States. 
Furthermore, it the new basio quota for other Communi t;y. undertakings were to 
·~·I··· 
,, 
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work out lower tba.:n their preeent ba,sio quotas, it soould be possible for them 
to opt for the latter quota l::zy' abandoning production in ex.oess of the ba.sio 
quota unde:r the conditions sp~ified in paragraph 18o 
In the light of th~ abowe~ th~ c~efficient to b0 used tor the purpose of 
oalcule.timg basic quota.lll ~oold. b~ put a.t a.ppx-o~~,;tely 0.93e 
15. Given the pMuliariti~s of thel sugar market a,t~d the purpose of the quota 
system, ~'!'ovisi~n shonld be me,d~ for each undertakiDg's quota being jointly 
administer~ by b~@t p:roduoer~ ~ the sugar ma.nu.faotur®r. In the event of 
un.de:r-takings being :ma'!t'ged, the quotas granted to the individual undertakings 
oonoen1ed ,would be OQmbined ~nl.y if the interests of beet produoers were 
sa:f egua.rded. 
l 
I 
I 
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.· 
;. 
,- •. 
I ' I 
• 
./ 
-8- . . -
(b) Measures to promote specialization 
16. The price for beet produced in excess of the basic quotas ("B" sugar 
beet or sugar) would be fixed at such a level that: 
- only those undertakings and regions best suited to beet growing· would 
be induced to produce "B" sugar beet; 
- total production would remain within the limits determined by potential 
· outlets. 
This could be achieved by charging a production lev.y which would be fixed 
before each marketing year for beet and sugar production in excess of the 
basic quotas. In this WB\Y't the e:r.-works price would remain uniform for 
all sugar production up to the level of the maximum quotas and a single 
Community market would be guaranteed. 
17. To avoid a blockage of production at undertaking level, it is essential 
that it should be possible to adjust the basic quotas allocated. One way 
of doing this would be to allocate 851' of an undertakingS• s basic quota on 
a definitive basis and the remaining 151' on a temporary basis. This wo·uld 
ensure a certain amount of flexibility as regards the total level of quotas 
and their distribution and would make it possible for newcomers to begin 
sugar production. 
18. FUrthermore, to promote regional specialization, special steps must be 
taken to restrict the production of "B" sugar beet in areas less suited to 
beet growing. 
The following arrangements could be made for undertakings abandoning "B" 
production: 
- undertakings whose basio quota calculated in accordance with 
paragraph 14 worked out lower than their present basic quota could be. 
allowed to opt for their present quota; 
- provision could be made, within certain limits, for a negative oarr.y-over 
(as against the positive carry-over which is applicable at present) if the 
undertaking• s production .falls short of the basic quota; 
,./. 
1 J •• 
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- provision could be made, within certain limits, for sugar carried over 
to be covered. by arrangements for off-setting storage costa •. 
If these measures were approved, a considerable number of Communi t;y producers 
could be expected to opt for abandoning "B" production. The option could be 
for a specified period 
period. 
_J a.nd could be renewed for each new 
(c) Measures for limiting production to potential outlets 
19. The international undertakings to be given by the Community will in 
any event mean that production will have to be limited to potential outlets. 
This would appear to call for the fixing of a ma:ximum quota for each undertaking 
in addition to the basic quota. Production in excess of the ma:ximum quota could 
1 ' . 
not as a general rule be disposed of either inside or outside the ~mmunit;y 
and would consequently be carried over to the follo.,ing marketing year. 
The coefficient, which would be the same for the whole Community, relating 
maximum quotas to basic quotas, would be calculated on the be.sia of: 
- potential outlets; 
- prQbable production within: 
(a) the basic quotas; 
(b) the maximum quotas. 
Thus the level of these ma:ximum quotas could be -· ; 115~ to 118% 
of the basic quotas for the first marketing year (1975/76). This percentage 
could be increased in subsequent marketing years in line with the annual 
1 to 1.5~ increase in human consumption. 
Furthermore, the level of the ma.ximu quotas would have to be reviewed,it at 
the end of a marketing year, total production in that marketing year falls 
short of potent~l outlets or there is. shortage on the world market. 
1 . 
'l'here would be no restriction in the event of a world shortage Viz~, if 
prices on the world market rose above & certain level which would be ma:rked 
by the abolitionof exgort quotas UIMl.er the Inte:ma.tioal SUgar Agreement. 
• 
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Final~, sugar produced in excess of the maximum quotas and carried 
forward to the following marketing year should, within certain limits, 
benefit from arrangements for offsetting storage costs. 
III. IMPORTS OF SUGAR FROM THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SPECIFIED IN PARTICULAR 
IN PROTOCOL NO 22 TO ACT OF ACCESSION 
20. The negotiation of import arrangements for sugar from the developing 
countries specified in Protocol No 22 to the Act of Accession and from 
India must be viewed in the light of the existing commitments to these 
countries. At present the Community imports a total of 1 345 000 metric tons 
'from_.the _d.~yeloping countries which are party to the O~mmonwea.lth Sugar 
Agreement and a total of 4 000 metric tons from Surinam. 
The prices currently obtained by the supplying countries of the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement are £61 per metric ton for the Caribbean Islands and 
£57 per metric ton for the other countries (fob stage - exporting country). 
The forthcoming negotiations will centre around tonnage of sugar and the 
reference price. 
Bases of the cominfi negotiations 
21. If, within the framework of the negotiations with existing members of 
the CSA, the question of tonnages is to be discussed in the spirit of 
Protocol No 22, the tonnages to be allocated to some of the sugar-exporting 
AASM must be fixed in the light of their production, their consumption and 
the proportion of their exports effected under special arrangements. 
On the question of prices, two yardsticks are to hand, name~: current prices 
under the CSA and the lowest price applicable in the Community. 
Contractual and mutual obligations 
22. To meet the interests of supplying countries, particularly with regard 
to the investment necessar,y in the sugar industry, the Community should 
guarantee to purchase the tonnages in question. As against this, since the 
Community's future internal policy might render the importation of a fixed quantity 
- 11 -
of sugar necessary in the event of a bad harvest, it is essential that 
the contracting countries should be obliged to deliver sugar under the 
.new agreement. If a contracting country failed to meet its commitments 
for reasons of force majeur one or more of the other contracting 
countries should be required to make up the shortfall from their export 
availabilities. An assurance of this kind should be given by producing/exporting 
member countries under the OCAM sugar agreement and under the existing 
CSA. 
The present Commonwealth Sugar Agreement does in fact impose such an 
obligation on supplying countries, just as it requires the United Kingdom to 
purchase these quantities. 
The purchase gfia.rantee offered by the· CollliDUtiity should be baoked up by 
commercial measures. In exceptional cases intervention agencies could be required 
to b~ in th~'Sugar offered in aooordanoe With the terms Of the agreement. 
Finally, to en~ourage industrializati~ in ,exporting countries, the Community 
should make th~ necessar.y arrangements to facilitate importation of any 
white sugar offered by these· countries. n 
IffiPort arrangements 
23. The dispo~l of sugar from ~eveloping countries depends to a. large 
extent on futur-e refining oa.paci ty in the C~inmuni ty. 
This sugar can be refined in specialized refineries (i.e. establishments 
which only' refine raw suga:o into white sugar) or in sugar factories where 
refining is aiilllide-line, their main a.otivit:t being the production of white sugar 
from beet.· It 1 goes without aa;ying that ref:ining costs in "specialized" 
refineries ar~ higher than in "side-line" refineries. A veey considerable 
proportion o:r' the refining oapa.oi ty ot ••specialized" refineries will be 
required to retina imported raw sucu-. 
,• ,, 
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24. For this reason the following arrangements should be introduced for 
importing the sugar in question: 
The sugar would be purchased at the cif world market price, with the 
proviso that this purchase price could not exceed the lowest price applicable 
in the Community. A levy would be imposed to raise the price of the sugar 
to the level of the threshold price. A repayment would be made to the 
sugar refining industry so that the white sugar produced oould compete on 
the internal market without effecting the marketing of Community-produced 
sugar. 
25. Because of the difference between refining costs in "specialized" 
refineries and in "side line" refineries, .the repayment referred to above 
must vary with the type of undertaking refining the sugar. 
To reserve a certain quantity of sugar to free competition between all 
factories, refining quotas should be fixed for "specialized" refineries 
for the purpose of applying the repayments. These quotas could represent 
85% to 90% of the total quantity to be refined in the Community~. When 
these quotas are being established allowance must be made for the quantity 
of ~efined raw sugar imported from the French overseas departments. As in 
the case of the production quotas, 85% of these refining quotas should be 
allocated on a definitive basis and the remaining 15% on a temporary basis. 
26. If (in exceptional cases) these measures failed to ensure that th~ £ugar 
in question is imported into the Community, the exporting country would 
have the right to offer that sugar to Community intervention agencies. 
Prior notice would have to be given so that appropriate Community measures 
could be taken. A tendering procedure would seem to be the most appropriate 
method of selling the sugar within the Community. 
1 This percentage would be correspond to ratio which shall exist bet-
ween the sugar produced in the Community within the basic quotas 
and total production, i.e. representing the part of production for 
which Community sugar producers are accorded full guarantees. 
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27. Export earnings would be stabilized by means of non-refundable loans 
where actual export earnings of beneficiary countries fall below a 
reference level. 
· 'The reference level would be calculated by multiplying the quantities 
allocated to each country under the Agreement to be negotiated by a 
reference price to be determined by reference to tne·present negotiated prioe 
under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement which is most favourable to the 
-
.developing countries. 
If, as a result of low world market prices, a drop in quantities available 
for export or a combination of the two, actual export earnings fall below 
the reference level calculated above, the Community,without prejudice 
to paragraph 22. Will, under the general arrangements for stabilizing 
export eam:i.rgs introduced under Protocol :No 22, make non-refundable 
compensation available to exporiing countries to bridge the gap between 
the reference level and the actual level. 
Procedures for the transfer and utilization of ·such loans will be 
negotiated with the beneficiar,r countries •. 
-
... 
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IV. COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SUGAR AGREEMENT 
· 28. The second session of the United Nations Suga.r Conferenc~ chargee. 
with the task of preparing an International ~emen~ to r~plaoe the 
1968 Agreement which expires on 31 December of this year, will be held 
in Geneva from 10 September to 10 Ootober. 
On 17 April the Council agreed to adopt, on the basis of a oommur:.ioE.tion 
from the Commission, directives for participation by tha C~~unity and 
its Member States in this seoond session of the Confer~noe. This par~ of 
the document is therefore aimed at enabling the Council t~ take ~he appropriBte 
decisions.· 
29. The Commission believes the~ the attitude to be adopted by the 
Community at this decisive stage of the Conference should take th~ following 
ba.sio factors into considerationa · 
(a) The 1'968 Agreeme1.1,t no longer corresponds to the pree.ent rnax'ket 
situation and needa substantial ame~en~ (in pe~tioular with regard to 
prices and the level of quotas)• All exporting a.OO. :importing oountri$\'3 
therefore consider that an extension of the present Agreement, even in 
an &mended for.m, does not meet their re~tirementa. They consider that. 
the time is now ripe for the negotiation of a new five-yea~ international 
agreement. This being so, the Community cannot continue to !SUpport a.n 
extension of the existing Agreement in the face ~m~ the. express desire 
of almost 80 countries to negotiate a new one. 
('b) Statement~ made by m.oRt d~lega,tions sho't;r that they feel the;!< the 
suocessful ou.tooms of ·~ha Conf'el"ence and ths opera.t.ion of a.u, aff~otiva 
interna:tioMl rngr~ a.gre$ment depend on the ComrmllG.i ty. An;y poseibla 
aolution pre~m'.ppcsQs~ in their view, that the Community Moede!'i +,10 tha 
Agreement em ocmforms to );he agreed :rules. 
(o) Statistically apeald.ng, the present si tu,a.tion on the 1~wr.ld m<U"ket ~!.!d 
the Community mF~k~t can be summarized a5 followe: 
{i) World m,al'ket 
World produ,otion ,,,.a,g ocn~icierably in exoeas of OQnsum.ption c1v .. :t"i:ng 
thEl eeoond half c·:~ the period 1960/1970, leeding to ;.nore.~~e£, w~::-lcl 
stooks am ver;r low prices on the world market. Sinoe the 19[0/?1 
•t I I ., 
15 - .. 
marketing year the opposite has applied. Consumption has 
outstripped production to bring stooks down to a minimal level 
and prices on the world market have risen aooordingly. In 
1968/69 world market prices represented a quarter of the Community 
price but by 1970/71 they had. quadrupled a.nd are now around the 
same level as the Community price. 
(ii) Community market 
Production in the old Six and in Denmark and 'Ireland had always 
been in excess of domestic consumption; the United Kin@iom has 
always had a deficit. The world shortage and the resulting high 
prices caused production in and exports by the enlarged Community 
to inorease,partioularly over the three last marketing years. At 
the same time Community imports fell slightly. 
The enlarged Community, which had a deficit over the 1968/69 to 1970/71 
marketing years, is nqw self-sufficient as evidenced by average production 
' in 1971 and 1972. , 'This increase in Community production helped 
considerably to cover import requirements from the world market and 
meant that the Community did not help to accentuate the increase.in 
world prices, a development which would have been very prejudicial, 
inter alia, to importing developing countries. 
(iii) Trends 
In the past, world consumption has increased at an annual rate of 3% 
to 3. 5%• Although this trend is being slowed down by high prices 
on the world market, world production would need to increase at an 
annual rate of at least 3% to meet demand. Since the possibility 
of stepping up sugar production in developing countries within a 
short period of time is relatively limited, a sharp reduction in 
production by developed countries would only make the world shortage 
more acute. 
.. ~·-: 
.. 
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Finally, it must be remembered that the Community is now the world's 
largest exporter of white supr, the other exporting countries 
, supply raw sugar~ 
-30._ For these reasons the Commission believes that it would be possible 
for the Community to aooed.e to the new agreement - if it is satisfactory . 
for the Community and for the present oontraoting countries - provided 
the Council P,eoided that Communi~~ production should not in principle 
exceed internal consumption leas the tonnage imported under Protocol 
No 22 to the Act of Accession (1.4 million metric tons) plus 800 000 metric 
tons to be e~orted to the world market. Under these conditions the 
Community would have the status of net impor~er under the Agreement; its 
. ' . 
imports would exceed its exports by at least 600,000 metric tons • 
. 
31. The Community must also define the role it intends to play in 
contributing to stabilization of the free market. 
Thus: 
(a) in the event of a shortage on the world market, the Community should be 
allowed to dispose of any surpluses on the world market, in other words, 
to become a net exporter without any quantitative limitations. A 
shortage i~ deemed to exist when prices rise above the level beyoni which· 
export quotas no longer apply. 
(b) the Community should also make clear that it intends to give the same 
undertakings as exporting members with regard to conditions of sale to 
countries which are not members of the agreement and the supply guarantees 
due to the other importing members, provided that importing countries . 
. agree to observe a minimum purchase price when prices are low on the 
world market. 
'11 f I ,,.._, 
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(c) furthermore, the Community should contribute to price stabili~ation 
by requesting that storage measures to promote such stabilization 
be taken b7 exporting oountries and by developed importing countries. 
(d) the Community should hold out for realistic prioe levels which take 
account in pariioular of production costs in regions whose sugar 
production is necessary to oover import needs on the world market 
ana. of the prices now in foro~. under the special arrangements of the 
International Sugar Agreement. ; · 
~ 32. Sinoe the seoond session of the Conference opens on 10 September 
1973, the Commission would draw the Council's attention to the need for 
.) . 
the early adoption ot the direoti ves to be gi van to the delegation. 
The Community's position on all matters other than those dealt with 1n· this 
part of the dooument (prioe levels,~. eto•) woa.ld be adopted in aooordance 
with normal procedures. 
... ",. 
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l (a) Tonnage ourrentlz imported from developing countries under the Commonwealth 
~ar +Feement 
West Ind.ies and <lu1'a:na 
Mauritius 
Fiji Islands 
East Afrioa 
British Honduras 
' 
India 
. 
Swa.zila:nd 
~Southern Rhodesia 
(b) Tonnage currently imEorted :from Surinam: 
(1000 t, expressed in terms 
o:f white sugar) 
696 
375 
138 
7 
20 
25 
84" 
-
1 345 
:~23~ J 
4 000 t 
(c) Tbnnar like;Lz to be imported from the suga.:;-produoingJ!Xfortinf AASM 
Mada.guoa:r 
Congo 
(d) Grand 'otal of (a) (b) and (c) 
1In abeyance 
13 000 t 
. 38 000 t 
1 400 000 t 
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Proposal for a 
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 
of 
on the :f'u.ture sugar policy of the Community, on 
imports of sugar from the developing countries 
specified in particular in Protocol No 22 to the 
Aot of Accession and on the Community's position 
at the second session of the United Nations Sugar 
Conference 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
I. Has agreed as follows: 
(1) Common organization of the market in sugar as from 1 July 1975 
(a) A basic <IUOta shall be fixed for eaoh sugar undertaking in the Community 
b,y multiplying its production over the period 1968/69 to 1972/73 by a 
. 
ooeffioient o~ 0.93 whioh shall be identical throughout the Community. 
However,the basio quotas to be allocated to undertakings in the new 
Member States shall not be _lower than the basio quotas applicable under 
existing production arrangements. 1 Eighty-five per cent of eaoh basic 
quota shall be allocated on a definitive basis and fifteen per cent on a 
temporary basis. 
(b) A maximum quota shall be fixed for eaoh sugar undertaking in the Community. 
The level of this maximum quota ,whioh shall be in proportion to the ba.aic 
quota for eaoh undertaking, shall be fixed annually on the basis of 
potential outlets and probable production within the basic and maximum 
quotas. 
(o) Production in excess of the maximum quota shall not be disposed of either 
inside or outside the Community and shall therefore be carried over to the 
following market year. 
(d) Howevera 
(i) it: m~ be decided after the event to increase the level of the maximum 
quotas fixed before the relevant marketing year began, provided that actual 
production within the maximum quotas does not exceed potential outletsr 
... ;~ .. 
. ' . .,.. 
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(ii} No marketing restrictions shall apply if there is a shortage on 
the world market. A shortage shall be· deemed to exist if the 
world market price exceeds the level specified in 3(b). 
(e) · :The\ level of sugar and beet prices applicable to production within the 
:..--· ... 
basic and maximum quotas shall. be so fixed that: 
( i) only those undertakings and areas which are best suited to beet 
growing would be induced to produce B beet and B sugar ; 
(ii) total production would remain within the 'limits determined 
bY votential~outlets. 
' 
A production leV7-f'ixEid. betore each aU:ga.r-mar1Cetlng-year -shall be applied 
,to beet or sugar Produced in excess of the basic quotas • 
. (f) Where, for a given period, a.n undertaking opts for the fixing of a maximum 
quota equal to the basic quota, the latter shall not be lower than that 
applicable before 1 Ju4' 1975o Moreover, within certain limits, a negative 
carr,y-over m~ be applied if production falls short of the basic quota. 
(g) Within certain limits, sugar carried forward shall be covered b,y the 
s,ystem for offsetting storage costs. 
(h) The beet producers and sugar manufacturers concerned ~hall.&dminister· 
the undertaking's quota. , , 
'· 
.. 
.... ; .... 
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2. ArranS!ments applicable to sugar imported from the developing countries, 
specified in Protocol No 22 ~o the Aot of Accession and from India: 
J (a) The Community shall offer to import an annual quantity of 1 400 000 metric 
tons, expressed in terms of white sugar, from these countries. 
(b) The tonnage specified in (a) shall be allocated among the countries 
concerned on the basis ofa 
- the tonnage exported at the negotiated price under the Commonwealth 
Sugar Agreement; 
- the tonnage exported on other terms under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement; 
- the tonnage exported under oth~r special &rraJ!~ments; 
- the present and foreseeable importance of sugar production and sugar 
exports for the economy of the country concerned. 
(c) The Community shall ensure that this quantity is purchased by adopting commercial 
measures and, in exceptional oases, by obliging intervention agencies to 
purchase the sugar at the world market priceo The purchase price shall not, 
however, be higher than the lowest price applicable in the Community. 
·In return, the countries given this guarantee shall undertake to deliver 
the agreed tonnages to the Community. 
(d) Up to 85% to 90% of the tonnage of imported sugar specified above plus 
the tonnage imported from the French overseas departments shall be allocated 
among "specialized" refineries in the Community as refining quotas whiol'). 
will. qualit,y for a speoifio rep~ent reflecting processing oosts in that 
induatr.rr 85~ of these quotas &hall be allocated on a definitive basis and 
the remaining· 15% on a tempera.r,y baaia. 
(e) Where benefioiar,1 countries offer: white 'sugar for importation into the 
Community, the Community shall take the neoesse.r,y steps to . •.eoure the 
admission of suoh white sugar. 
(t) Under the general arrangements to stabilize export earnings, the Community 
shall . gua.rantee by means of non-refundable loans the stability of earnings 
aooruing to beneficiary countries from exports of sugar to the Community. 
These loans shall equal the difference between a reference level and the 
actual level of earn~nga. 
. .. ; .... 
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3. Communlty pPrttotpatLon ln the seooad EesglgggE-llg- tinltEd Nations ,
,I
Sugar GonfE:ronoe
tta(") ltre OomrrunLty woulil."'partLoi,pate Ln a new sugar agtreenent ae a net tmporter.
It r,uoi[d. rmd,ertako to t"tnlt tte cxporte so that LtE tmports wou,ld. ercoeed,
tts erqports try at leaet 600 0OO metnl,o toase
"a
I- - : .i
(t) Eowevenl la the event of a uor1d, slrorta6el tbore should, be no qrrantltati.ve
reetrlotion 04. orqports fron thE 0omnun"{.ty. A ehorta6e ehell be oonsidered'
to ex*st oa tho world narkct whea erpont qrr,otas o6aso to appLy,
IIo InvLtEE the ComniEsLonr
' 1c To preoont to ltr bsf,ore 1 Dsoeaber 1973t pnoXlosale for regulatLoaE on
' frrtrrre'produotion airangonentel eEtabltshed. tn aosond"enoe rfth the elenents
agreed. upon above;
2o llo oonoLud.el rdthtn the framewbnlc of, tbe negottattons for ths renewal of, the
AEEoolatlonr 
*q+...ageemsiit.baeeaL on.'Uhe prtaol,ples andl faotoro agreadl' upon
pbovb dl.ttr the ougar-erporttag oountnf,ee refernedL to *n I.23
3. [ro partlolpates Ln aooond.anoe wlth the uEua]. prooedurel i.n lbhe sessnd. eesslon
of the Uaited Natloaal Sugar Oonfereaoe und.on the oondLtlonE epeolfled
Ln I.3
I
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